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2016 IIP Argentina Research Paper
When Argentina’s new president, Mauricio Macri, took office in December 2015, he
faced high inflation, economic stagnation, fiscal deficit, depressed foreign trade, downward
pressure on the value of the currency and a long-running debt dispute with vulture funds. In
1989, when President Carlos Menem came into power, he faced a similar economic situation.
President Menem followed the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal approach to address the
problems in the 1990s, but his policies eventually led the country to the 1998–2002 Argentine
Great Depression. Many worry that President Macri may repeat what happened in the 1990s
and lead Argentina to another crisis. This paper tries to analyze the reasons for the 1998–2002
Argentine Great Depression and the likelihood that President Macri will repeat the tragedy.
Economic Situation in 1989
President Menem was elected in 1989 to succeed President Raul Alfonsin. At the time,
Argentina’s economic situation was full of doom and gloom. “Following more than a decade of
high inflation and economic stagnation, and after several failed attempts to stabilize the
economy, in late 1989 Argentina had fallen into hyperinflation and a virtual economic
collapse.” 1
The data was shocking: “In 1989, only 30,000 out of 30 million Argentines paid any
income taxes. That year, inflation reached an unprecedented 5,000 percent, rising so fast that
some supermarkets read prices out over intercoms rather than bothering to update price
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tags.” 2 The crisis interrupted the normal running of the society and it fell into chaos. Strikes
swept the country and rioters looted supermarkets for their survivals. President Alfonsin
decided to hand over power five months early to Menem.
Foreign trade was also severely impacted: “the ability of Latin America's third-largest
economy to maintain its imports has been clouded in recent days by the sharpening foreign
exchange shortage and by growing skepticism among foreign creditors.” 3 In June, “an attorney
charged by Mr. Menem with auditing the national treasury, estimated that Argentina's hard
currency reserves are $200 million, enough to cover two weeks of imports.” 4
Menem’s Economic Policies
The economic, political and social crises forced President Menem to immediately take a
reformist course. His approach was to follow the Washington Consensus, which is a list of ten
policies coined in 1989 by English economist John Williamson “for a conference that the
Institute for International Economics convened in order to examine the extent to which the old
ideas of development economics that had governed Latin American economic policy since the
1950s were being swept aside by the set of ideas that had long been accepted as appropriate
within the OECD.” 5 The ten policies include fiscal discipline, a competitive exchange rate, trade
liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, and privatization. 6
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“Menem spent the 1990s cultivating foreign investment, slashing import tariffs, and
privatizing money-losing state enterprises.” 7 In 1991, the Menem regime passed the
Convertibility Law to peg the Argentine currency to the U.S. dollar. The new exchange rate
regime was designed to tackle inflation once and for all, and stabilize the economy. It
establishing a hard nominal peg with U.S. dollar’s stable value, forcibly giving peso the same
value. market-oriented structural reforms to promote efficiency and productivity in the
economy. Moreover, as part of the Convertibility Plan, “various service sectors were
deregulated, trade was liberalized, and anticompetitive price-fixing schemes were removed;
privatization proceeded vigorously, notably in oil, power, and telecommunications, yielding
large capital revenues.” 8
The Convertibility Plan immediately served its original purpose, and was a success for
the early years. “Inflation, which was raging at a monthly rate of 27 percent in February 1991,
declined to 2.8 percent in May 1991; on an annual basis, inflation fell to single digits in the
summer of 1993 and remained low (or even negative) from 1994 to the end of the convertibility
regime in early 2002.” 9
After the most urgent problem of inflation was solved, the fiscal austerity and economic
liberalization did their jobs to improve the economy. “The overall fiscal balance of the federal
government improved significantly from the previous years, with an average budgeted deficit of
less than 1 percent of GDP during 1991–98. Growth performance was impressive through early
1998, except for a brief setback in 1995 when Argentina was adversely affected by the Mexican
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crisis. For 1991–98, GDP growth averaged nearly 6 percent a year, vindicating the marketoriented reforms introduced in the early 1990s. Attracted by a more investment-friendly
climate, there were large capital inflows in the form of portfolio and direct investments. During
1992–99, Argentina received more than $100 billion in net capital inflows, including over $60
billion in gross foreign direct investments.” 10
“In October 1998, the performance of Argentina received the attention of the world
when President Carlos Menem shared the podium of the Annual Meetings with the IMF
Managing Director, who characterized ‘the experience of Argentina in recent years’ as
‘exemplary.’ The Managing Director further remarked: ‘Argentina has a story to tell the world: a
story which is about the importance of fiscal discipline, of structural change, and of monetary
policy rigorously maintained.’” 11
The Crisis 12
The 1998–2002 Argentine Great Depression started with a combination of adverse
external shocks, including a reversal in capital flows to emerging markets following the Russian
default in August 1998; weakening of demand in major trading partners, notably in Brazil; a fall
in oil and other commodity prices; general strengthening of the U.S. dollar against the euro;
and the 70 percent devaluation of the Brazilian real against the U.S. dollar in early 1999.
Argentina’s performance deteriorated from the second half of 1998. Real GDP fell by
over 3% in the second half of 1998. There was a mild pickup in economic activity in the second
half of 1999, spurred by increased government spending in the run-up to the October
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presidential elections, but this was not sustained and GDP declined by 3.5% for 1999 as a
whole. The economy never recovered through the depression.
The economic slowdown, coupled with the election-driven surge in public spending in
1999, hit Argentina’s fiscal solvency hard. The country’s consolidated fiscal balance had been in
deficit throughout the 1990s except in 1993, but the magnitude was not large. The situation
changed in 1999, when growth decelerated and the public finances deteriorated sharply. The
debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 37.7% of GDP at end-1997 to 47.6% at end-1999, an increase of
10% points in just two years. The ratio would eventually reach 62% at the end of 2001.
Argentina’s problems intensified in 2000, and the convertibility regime prevented the
government from making effective reactions. In 2000, growing solvency concerns over the
cumulative increase in public debt were exacerbated by the continued appreciation of the U.S.
dollar and a further drying up of capital flows to emerging market economies. These
developments would normally require a smaller current account deficit and a depreciation of
the real exchange rate, but the convertibility regime placed severe limitations on the ability of
Argentina to achieve this adjustment in a manner that could avoid recession.
From the spring of 2001, the authorities took a series of measures in quick succession,
including: an announced plan to change the anchor of the convertibility regime from the U.S.
dollar to an equally weighted basket of the dollar and the euro (the switch to take effect only
when the two currencies reached parity); a series of heterodox industrial or protectionist
policies (called “competitiveness plans”), involving various tax-exemption measures in sectors
most adversely affected by the recession; and an exchange of outstanding government bonds
totaling $30 billion in face value for longer maturity instruments (the so-called mega-swap).
5

However, many of these measures were perceived by the markets as desperate or impractical,
and served to damage market confidence.
Despite these initiatives and the financial support of the IMF, market access could not
be restored, and spreads on Argentine bonds rose sharply in the third quarter of 2001. Amid
intensified capital flight and deposit runs, capital controls and a partial deposit freeze were
introduced in December 2001. With Argentina failing to comply with the fiscal targets, the IMF
indicated that it could not clear the disbursement scheduled for December. At the end of
December, following the resignation of President Fernando De La Rua, the country partially
defaulted on its international obligations. In early January 2002, Argentina formally abandoned
the convertibility regime and replaced it with a dual exchange rate system.
Factors Contributing to the Crisis
Given the time length and complexity of the development of the 1998–2002 Argentine
Great Depression, many factors, domestic and external, are pointed to for contributing to the
crisis. IMF summarized the following three factors as critically important: (i) weak fiscal policy
(Mussa, 2002); (ii) the rigid exchange rate regime (Gonzales Fraga, 2002); and (iii) adverse
external shocks (Calvo and others, 2002).13
IMF divides all factors into two classes: one that generated vulnerability and the
immediate factors that triggered the crisis. 14 “In the absence of triggering events, a crisis may
not have occurred when it did, but the underlying vulnerability would have continued and a
crisis could have been triggered later by other adverse shocks. In the absence of the underlying
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vulnerability, however, the same adverse developments would not have had the catastrophic
effects that were associated with the crisis, though they may well have produced some
negative effects.” 15
Weak fiscal policy is one of the major reasons for Argentina’s underlying vulnerability.
“The weak fiscal policy created serious liquidity problems for the government when market
conditions tightened and led to the eruption of a funding crisis in early 2001. If Argentina’s
public sector had generated surpluses in its fiscal account during the precrisis years, it could
have avoided the tightening liquidity constraints in 2000 and the all-out funding crisis of the
public sector in 2001. Argentina also would have enjoyed greater flexibility in using fiscal policy
to cope with the impact of adverse shocks, and would have been spared from the need to
contract fiscal policy when output was already declining.” 16 The Menem government had used
up all the money in its treasury, depriving itself of the necessary fiscal ammunition to fight the
external shocks. It was also in serious debt, so it could not borrow to finance effective fiscal
policies.
“Underlying this poor fiscal performance were Argentina’s weak political institutions,
which persistently pushed the political system to commit more fiscal resources than it was
capable of mobilizing. Public expenditure could not be controlled because spending was often
used as an instrument of political favor. Tax administration was also weak, leading to
widespread tax avoidance and evasion, and efforts to improve tax compliance were not
successful.” 17 Dr. Eduardo Stordeur from Di Tella University points out that in the 1990s, the
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Menem regime used government spending to force stability. Such cost was high, resulting in
unsustainably high government debt. 18
Many believe that the main mistake was the pegging of the peso to the dollar. Nobel
Prize winning economist and former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz is one of them:
“This was ‘a system doomed to failure’, not because of mistakes made by the country, but
because of shocks from beyond its borders that were caused by the volatility of international
financial markets... Sticking to the peso-dollar peg resulted from a single-minded focus on
inflation, without a concern for employment or growth” 19 This is agreed by Guillermo Perry and
Luis Servén: the peg to an appreciating dollar played a dominant role in the emergence of the
Argentine crisis. 20
IMF explains how the convertibility regime hurt the country’s economy during the crisis:
“By all but eliminating money creation as a source of revenue, it raised the required level of
fiscal discipline. While this was extremely positive in terms of its impact on inflation, it also
increased the potential long-term disruptive effect if the fiscal discipline was not fully delivered.
It also made adjustment to adverse shocks more difficult by eliminating nominal depreciation
as an instrument of policy. Had wages and prices been sufficiently flexible downward, the
required real exchange rate depreciation could have been achieved through price deflation. In
the absence of downward wage flexibility, the improvement in the current account required by
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the series of adverse shocks that hit Argentina from late 1998 could only be achieved through a
prolonged demand contraction.” 21
Even former Justice Rodolfo C. Barra agreed that the convertibility plan was a mistake
for the last few years of President Menem’s term. 22 Justice Barra served as a justice of the
Supreme Court of Argentina between 1989 and 1993, and as Minister of Justice between 1993
and 1996. He has been a firm supporter for President Menem’s economic policies, and was in
charge of drafting laws for privatization in the 90’s.
Dr. Jose Gabriel Palma emphasizes financial liberalization’s role in generating
vulnerability in Argentina’s economy, especially the full opening of the capital account
to international financial markets. Argentina had opened up its capital accounts since President
Menem came into power, and it “had done so at a time of high liquidity in international
financial markets, and slow growth.” 23 “Foreign capital swamped [Argentina] due to several
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.” 24 “Push” factors included excess liquidity in international financial
markets, business cycle conditions, changes in interest rates, the rise of institutional investors
always in need of new profitable assets, and demographic forces in industrial countries, while
“pull” factors included the combination of radical economic reforms (in particular wholesale
privatizations, and trade liberalization) and the opening up of the capital account in a context of
undervalued asset markets, high interest rate spread, and expectations of stable exchange rate
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under the convertibility plan.25 Unfortunately, not only did the tsunami of inflows have little or
no positive impact on the real economy, it increased volatility and the correlation of returns on
financial assets, which were both proved when adverse external shocks hit Argentina in 1998.26
Economic Situation Today
Argentina’s new president, Mauricio Macri, took office recently in December 2015. The
economic situation that he faced was not promising. His administration inherited from the last
regime: “[o]ne of the world’s highest inflation rates, near 30% poverty, an ‘historically high’
budget deficit of 7% of GDP, a slump in Central Bank reserves, and a long-running debt dispute
with vulture funds.” 27
Before President Macri, former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her late
husband, Néstor Kirchner, who governed before her, had been in power since 2003. Their
economic policies reflected “priority for financial independence, social equity, and what
may be considered a commitment to ‘populist’ macroeconomic solutions.” 28 To achieve these
goals, many believe that the regime sabotaged the rule of law by micromanaging the market.
Economy was distorted by their interventionist policies.
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Inflation was high. It reached 38% in 2014, and dropped to 26.9% in 2015. 29 “Given
political intervention in the National Institute of Statistics, official reports are not credible; but
all estimates suggest that before the recent devaluation, inflation exceeded 20% [in 2016].” 30
Economic stagnation was a serious problem. In 2015, before the elections brought
economic hope, its economy was projected to show little or negative growth that year.31
Argentina was still indebted to American hedge funds, making it unable to access foreign
investment. The country could not develop its economy without necessary capital. For example,
a massive oil field sat untouched because the country did not have the money to drill. 32
Argentina's economy relied heavily on commodities like oil and soybeans. 33 Prices for those two
have tanked in 2015, and the country's two key trade partners -- Russia and China -- have
slowed down. What makes it worse is that the government also suffered from a 5.4 percent
GDP budget deficit (the biggest since 1982).34
The exchange rate of peso was also unstable. “Trade protection, managed exchange
rates, and capital controls, for example, are policy adjustments required to address problems
that materialize in a constrained economic system (e.g., subsidy-driven fiscal expansion, price
controls, inability to borrow internationally) that cannot easily accommodate current account
deficits, a market exchange rate, or standard macroeconomic responses to high inflation.” 35 In
29
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November 2011, the Kirchner regime introduced currency controls, named el cepo (or “the
clamp”), which made it almost impossible for ordinary Argentines to purchase dollars, preferred
by savers to the inflation-prone peso.36 It substantially overvalued peso. After President Macri
freed the currency, it fell by more than 30%. 37
Macri’s Economic Policies
President Macri “has wasted little time in undoing the populist policies of his
predecessor. On December 14th he scrapped export taxes on agricultural products such as
wheat, beef and corn and reduced them on soyabeans, the biggest export. Two days later
Alfonso Prat-Gay, the new finance minister, lifted currency controls, allowing the peso to float
freely. A team from the new government then met the mediator in a dispute with foreign
bondholders in an attempt to end Argentina’s isolation from the international credit
markets.” 38
“The economic reforms seem to be working. Farmers who had hoarded grain in the
hope that the tariffs would be lifted are now selling, replenishing foreign-exchange reserves
that had been drained to defend the artificially strong peso. The newly freed currency fell by
more than 30%, a further boost to exporters. It has stabilised at around 13 pesos to the dollar.
“Substantive” talks with holdout bondholders starting in early January could lead to a return to
credit markets in 2016.” 39
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“But the devaluation has pushed up the inflation rate, already more than 25% when Mr
Macri took office. To rein it back, on December 15th the central bank raised interest rates on
short-term fixed deposits by eight percentage points to 38%. The government hopes to
persuade business and trade-union leaders to keep tight control of prices and wages. But that
may prove difficult: the unions are fragmented and little disposed to help Mr. Macri, a centreright politician; businesses may balk at holding down prices.” 40
How Likely to Repeat the 1990s?
The similarities between the economic situations of 1989 and 2015 worry many that
Argentina might repeat the 1990s and have another crisis in the near future. Both periods saw
high inflation, economic stagnation, fiscal deficit, depressed foreign trade and downward
pressure on the value of the currency. What makes it more worrisome is that President Macri’s
economic policies mimic many of the Washington Consensus is policies: he vows to restore
fiscal discipline and bring down the budget deficit; he lifted currency controls to achieve a
competitive exchange rate and boost foreign trade liberalization; and he has managed solve the
debt issue to liberalize of inward foreign direct investment. At the same time, he vows to bring
down inflation.
There is one major difference between the economic situations of 1989 and 2015: the
level of inflation. In 1989, inflation reached an unprecedented 5,000%. It led to riots and
President Alfonsin’s early departure from the office. It was the most urgent problem to solve
for the Menem regime. In 2015, Argentina’s inflation rate was 26.9%. It was still one of the
world’s highest inflation rates, but it was incomparable to the number in 1989. This wins
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President Macri time and flexibility to address the inflation issue. The new regime was able to
choose drying up money supply with high interest rates to tackle high inflation, instead of
taking extreme measures such as the convertibility plan, which was believed to be a main
reason for the 1998–2002 Argentine Great Depression.
It is also worth noting President Menem and President Macri’s ideological differences.
Professor Estela Sacristan, an expert in administrative law and regulation, points out that while
President Menem was a far-right politician, President Macri is center-right. 41 President Menem
was a Peronist. “Peronism is a brand rather than a party. Its official vehicle is called the
Justicialist Party. To the extent that it has an ideology it is a vague blend of nationalism and
labourism, expressed in the PJ’s founding ‘three banners’ of political sovereignty, economic
independence and social justice.” 42 “In 1989 when he was elected president, people expected
Menem to carry forward a populist plan with a nationalistic style. Within a few short months,
however, he convinced many of his supporters of the need to take a sharp turn toward
neoliberal, monetarist, anti-statist policies.” 43
President Macri is clearly against the Kirchner regime’s interventionist policies, but
Professor Sacristan points out that “he is not a big fan of the market.” 44 “The party he founded
and leads, Republican Proposal (PRO), started out on the right but has become more inclusive.
It is non-Peronist—the political current to which his presidential rival, Daniel Scioli, belongs—
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but is not anti-Peronist; many ex-Peronists work alongside the party’s conservative founders.” 45
Therefore, although President Macri is introducing trade, currency and foreign investment
liberalization as President Menem did, he is likely to maintain a necessary level of regulations.
In this way, he can avoid the full opening of the capital account to international financial
markets, which would make Argentina’s economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks.
Conclusion
The similarities between the economic situations of 1989 and 2015 and the similarities
between President Menem and President Macri’s economic policies concern many that
Argentina might repeat the 1990s and have another crisis in the near future. But the truth may
not be as worrisome as it seems. When looked closely, there is one major difference between
the economic situations of 1989 and 2015: the inflation in 2015 was much lower than in 1989. It
gave President Macri flexibility to tackle high inflation with high interest rates, instead of taking
extreme measures such as the convertibility plan, which was believed to be a main reason for
the 1998–2002 Argentine Great Depression. Furthermore, while President Menem was a farright politician, President Macri is center-right. The current regime is likely to maintain a
necessary level of regulations, and avoid the full opening of the capital account to international
financial markets, which was another reason for the Depression.
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